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Capital Controls and the Current Financial Crisis:
Revisiting the Malaysian Experience
by Giovanni Cozzi and Machiko Nissanke, Economics Department, SOAS
The severity of the ongoing financial crisis has heightened 
concerns about the negative impact of unregulated capital movements 
on developing countries. This concern has also revived the debate on the 
effectiveness of temporary capital controls as a policy response to such a 
crisis.
The debate on capital controls, which was started about a decade ago, at 
the time of the Asian financial crisis, remains unresolved. On one side, some 
economists argue that temporary capital controls are an effective way to 
stabilize an economy facing a severe external financial crisis, especially 
when ‘standard’ macroeconomic responses have failed. On the other side, 
some economists argue that capital controls are used primarily as a vehicle 
for supporting politically-connected businesses.
Drawing on the Malaysian experience with temporary capital controls 
in 1998-99, this Development Viewpoint argues that temporary capital 
controls can be, under certain circumstances, an effective way for 
developing countries to insulate themselves from the contagion effects of a 
financial crisis. 
We also point out that such controls could be used by developing countries 
to ‘maintain domestic ownership of local firms’ (Cooper, 1999) if that were a 
policy objective. However, we note that the success of temporary controls 
hinges on the extent to which a country’s central bank can supervise and 
regulate the financial sector. In the absence of such a condition, Malaysian-
style capital controls could not be easily replicated. 
We therefore suggest the need for further studies of other forms of controls, 
such as a two-tiered currency transaction tax (see Nissanke 2005). Such a tax 
would include a zero or very low tax rate on currency transactions during 
tranquil market conditions but a higher temporary surcharge automatically 
imposed during speculative attacks on a country’s currency. Being able to 
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impose such a surcharge would help central banks defend their currencies 
without having to resort to building up large international reserves or tightly 
regulating the financial sector.
Free Capital Mobility
Mainstream macroeconomic literature assumes that the effects of financial 
globalisation on economic development are positive. One of the key 
assumptions is that when impediments to free capital mobility are removed, 
funds should flow from capital-rich to capital-poor countries. Such capital 
flows are also assumed to improve the quality of governance of financial 
institutions and corporations, as well as strengthen the influence of market 
discipline on economic policy making.  
However, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, financial 
globalisation started to be challenged. Since then, a number of prominent 
studies have shown that there is little empirical evidence to the claim that 
international private capital flows are conducive to economic growth. 
Instead, the evidence indicates that they tend to increase financial fragility 
and the likelihood of financial crisis. 
In addition, because private capital flows tend to be procyclical, they do not 
provide developing countries with a useful disciplining function. There is also 
growing evidence that capital does not flow from rich to poor countries. In 
contrast, in the 2000s capital has flowed in the opposite direction, creating 
significant macroeconomic imbalances (see Cozzi and Nissanke 2009). 
Nonetheless, strong opposition still exists to any form of controls on private 
capital flows. 
Our review of the Malaysian experience with capital controls suggests that it 
is important to focus the debate on which controls could be most effective 
and under what circumstances, rather than opposing them as a matter of 
economic principle.
The Malaysian Experience 
We have assessed, in particular, the temporary 
capital controls imposed in Malaysia in 
1998-99 by trying to measure their impact on 
private agents. The objective of our research 
has been to identify the responses of different 
industrial sectors as well as politically-
connected and politically-independent 
businesses, both to the imposition of controls 
and their removal (see Cozzi and Nissanke 
2009).
Our study found that the initial response 
to capital controls of the tradable sector in 
Malaysia was negative, since it exhibited 
statistically significant negative abnormal 
returns on share values on the day that capital 
controls were imposed (and the Malaysian 
Ringgit was pegged to the US Dollar).
The Figure shows the trend in both the 
average share price of Malaysian tradable
Source: Thompson Reuters Datastream
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companies included in the Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (a capitalization-
weighted stock market index of the top 100 companies) and the Ringgit to 
US Dollar Exchange Rate. It reveals that after capital controls were imposed 
and the exchange rate was fixed in 1998, the average share price of tradable 
companies—despite dropping initially—recovered significantly through 
2000.
The results of our study suggest that capital controls, combined with the 
exchange rate peg, created stability in the currency and stock markets, 
and acted as a stimulus to the tradable sector. Thereafter, this sector, and 
particularly its electronics and resource-based industries, played a pivotal 
role in the recovery of the Malaysian economy.
Our study also indicates that the imposition of capital controls impacted 
differentially on politically-connected and politically-independent 
businesses. Politically-independent businesses exhibited an immediate 
negative response, as their share values markedly declined, while the share 
values of politically-connected firms did not change significantly. 
Our findings suggest, however, that the imposition of capital controls 
in Malaysia did not serve to exclusively support politically-connected 
businesses. By creating stability in the currency and stock markets, the 
controls ultimately favoured the tradable sectors of the economy as a whole. 
Interviews conducted with Malaysian government officials also suggest that 
the imposition of capital controls enabled them to continue implementing 
affirmative pro-Malay policies without external interference and maintain 
the domestic ownership of Malaysian firms. We argue that such conditions 
were important because they were essential to guaranteeing political and 
social stability. Ultimately, this stability benefited both politically-connected 
and politically-independent businesses. 
A year after the imposition of capital controls, that is, on 4th February 
1999, they were loosened substantially. Our study found that none of the 
businesses that we examined exhibited marked changes in share values 
on the day of the removal of controls. This effect implies that loosening 
capital controls did not significantly affect the asset values and behaviour of 
Malaysian firms. 
Impact and Lessons
Thus, we contend that capital controls assisted the recovery of the Malaysian
economy and helped bring back stability to the currency and stock markets. 
If the imposition of capital controls had been perceived negatively by 
investors during 1998, we would have expected that the loosening of capital 
controls in 1999 would have led to the formation of positive abnormal 
returns.
Capital controls in Malaysia were successful because, in part, there was little 
attempt to evade them. This was due to the characteristics and structure of 
the Malaysian banking system. For instance, the central bank of Malaysia had 
strong supervisory and regulatory powers. Also, domestic commercial banks 
had the largest share of the financial market in the 1990s. Furthermore, the 
government controlled, either directly or indirectly, four of the largest banks. 
Our findings confirm that capital controls can be, under certain conditions, 
an effective mechanism to insulate developing countries from the contagion 
effects of a financial crisis and can help reduce financial fragility. They can 
also be a useful tool to protect the domestic ownership of local firms. 
However, our study also suggests that the success of capital controls in 
Malaysia depended on the degree to which the central bank had significant 
supervisory powers and the domestic financial sector was effectively 
regulated. The measures used for capital control were comprehensive but 
cumbersome, embracing wide-ranging restrictions on various  transactions.
Hence, replicating Malaysian-style capital controls elsewhere would be 
difficult in the absence of a strong oversight and enforcement system. We 
suggest therefore that the potential of other mechanisms for controlling 
destabilising cross-border capital flows, such as a system of a two-tiered 
currency transaction tax, should be considered seriously as part of a new 
post-crisis global financial architecture. 
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